

## Examples: A Pragmatic Approach

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### Abstract

This study deals with a seemingly obvious topic to everyone – examples. Yet, on a closer perusal, the topic turns out to be interestingly perplexed. This can be justified by the amalgam of cognition and communication out of which such concept is delivered. This mixture gives a hand in texturizing examples. This work aims at pragmatically investigating the concept of ‘example’ as far as its definition, structure, types and functions are concerned. Furthermore, it aims at developing an eclectic model that will be utilized to pragmatically analyze the data of the work represented by four interviews with Donald Trump in 2018. Consequently, it hypothesizes the following: complex schema is more frequently used in the data; abductive inference is never employed in the data; faulty analogy is never made in the data; the interpersonal variant of the global type of examples is more frequently found in the data; explicit examples are more commonly given; and, finally, the argumentative function of examples prevails. Afterwards, the percentage equation is employed to statistically calculate the results of the analysis.

The study has come up with many conclusions, out of which is that examples, once chosen meticulously, support the cogency of argumentation by means of strengthening and boosting one’s standpoints towards the alleged goals.

**Key words:** schema, inference, analogy, interpersonal type, explicit, implicit, argumentative function.

## مدخل تداولي للأمثلة

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### المستخلص

تتناول هذه الدراسة موضوع المثال الذي يبدو واضحا للوهلة الأولى ؛ لأن فحواه وماهيته معروفة للجميع. ولكن النظر عن كثب لهذا الموضوع يكشف تعقيده الممتع لأنه مزيجا من الإدراك والتواصل اللذين يولدان معا أي مثال مذكور. عليه تهدف الدراسة الى تناول تداولي لمفهوم المثال من ناحية التعريف والتركييب البنيوي والانواع والوظائف فضلا عن تطوير نموذج تداولي يهدف الى تحليل البيانات المتمثلة بأربع مقابلات مع دونالد ترامب في عام ٢٠١٨. عليه تفترض الدراسة ما يلي: استخدام المخطط المعقد اكثر من غيره من المخططات في البيانات قيد الدراسة، و عدم استخدام الاستدلال المنطقي نهائيا في البيانات، كما وتفترض عدم عمل مقارنة مغلوبة في البيانات، والنوع الشخصي من الامثلة (الناجم عن العلاقات الشخصية) يستخدم أكثر من غيره من الأنواع، وتعطى الأمثلة الصريحة أكثر من مثيلاتها الضمنية، وأخيرا تفترض الدراسة ان الوظيفة الجدلية هي التي تتميز في البيانات. وتستخدم الدراسة بعد ذلك معادلة النسبة المئوية لحساب نتائج التحليل احصائيا. وتوصل البحث الى عدة استنتاجات إحداها أن الأمثلة تدعم، عند اختيارها بدقة، قوة الجدل بوساطة تعزيز وجهات النظر نحو الأهداف المنشودة.

الكلمات المفتاحية: المخطط، الاستنباط، المقارنة، النوع الشخصي، صريح، ضمني، الوظيفة الجدلية.

## 1. Introduction

Though simple and obvious at first glance, the concept of example is perplexed. This is mainly because an ‘example’ appeals to two levels: cognition and communication. Thus, what might be understood at the cognitive level can be out of context at the communicative peer. Consequently, what this aims to is to uncover this concept in a pragmatic way, hence citing its definition, constructing its structure, classifying it into various types, and finally tracing its functions. Moreover, and in accordance with all of these, the model of analysis will be built, and the data will be analyzed.

## 2. Examples: Definition, Structure, Type, and Function

### 2.1 Definition

Zillman and Brosius (2000, p. i) define examples (or exemplars, as they call them) as:

*Segments of pertinent experience that are stored in memory [that] provide samplings of information about past occurrences that foster our dispositions and ultimately direct behavior toward similar occurrences on later encounter.*

However, by presenting examples at the cognitive level to yield an amalgam of inference and analogy at the communicative peer. The former level (i.e. cognitive) is represented by what they refer to as “pertinent experience that [is] stored in memory”, whereas the latter level (i.e. communicative) is tokened by “direct behavior toward similar occurrences in later encounter”. The concept will be clearer in the course of discussing details below.

### 2.2 Structure

In line with the operational definition coined above, the following concepts set the building blocks of the structure of an example:

1. Cognition
2. Communication

As for the first, ‘cognition’ is a vast topic that has repercussions in various fields the first of which is psychology, which is out of the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, it can be reconfigured, in what serves the aims of this paper, by recalling Zillman and Brosius’ definition in two parts, each appeals to one concept. That is, the “pertinent experience that [is] stored in memory” is the first which has to do with ‘cognition’. The other part, however, is shown in its due place.

The key words in this quotation are “experience stored in memory”. The experience stored in memory, or what is usually referred to as ‘background knowledge’, shows how people can make use of the knowledge already stored in their minds about various situations in the world, and it is this point which makes this knowledge of special interest to the linguistic analysis: since it has to do with what is already stored in people’s minds, then the investigations made in this field can be generalized. This generalization has yielded the well-known theory of schema.

Schema<sup>(1)</sup> is defined, by Pankin (2013, p.1), as “an organized unit of knowledge for a subject or event. It is based on past experience and is accessed to guide current understanding or action”. By so defining it, Pankin agrees with Cook (1989, p.69) who sees the gist of schema as that the mind, stimulated by key words or phrases in the text, or by the context, activates a knowledge schema and uses it to make sense of the discourse<sup>(2)</sup>. That is to say, schema helps interpretation and, consequently, supports making inferences, all of which form a yardstick against which communication starts to get activated.

There are three major types of schemas, which are adopted for the analysis:

1. Complex Schema: Cook (1989, p.72) defines this type as the one which the human mind usually activates in normal everyday communication where more than one schema interact with each other at the same time. This is so because “actual discourse is unlikely to be interpretable with reference to a single schema”. Complex schemata, as Cook (ibid.) proceeds, are characterized by the following:

- They need not be limited to unordered catalogues of people and things within a stereotyped situation, or stereotyped sequences of events telling us what is likely to happen next.

- They may predict stereotypical roles and relationships of participants, or they can be stereotypical text types, predicting plot structure or conversational development. For example, almost all people have a restaurant-schema (e.g. chairs, tables, waiters, various kinds of food, etc.), yet this is not the all-and-only schema; it has a sub-schema within it: a menu-schema, for instance, and so on.

2. World and Text Schema: In his other book, Cook (1994, pp.14-5) explains this type as the order of information which speakers and writers follow in discourse. This ordering may be specific to a certain text type or discourse function. In a series of experiments conducted by Linde and Labov 1975, Cook (ibid.) continues, it has been shown that almost all subjects, who were asked to describe the place where they live (a house, a flat, etc.), followed the same order of describing the entrance, and then rooms branching off the entrance, returning to the hallway when they came to a dead end. Only after describing all the rooms would they then proceed to detail their contents. Put differently, their descriptions seem to follow a set pattern, which Cook describes as a ‘schema for describing one’s home’.

3. Interpersonal Schema: This type represents, as Widdowson (2007, pp.33-4) states, the customary ways in which we engage with second persons, the conventions we take for granted that concern how people normally interact with each other. Examples of this type would be those that inform the everyday routines we follow when meeting or greeting people, or the different transactions we carry out in service encounters: buying a ticket, making enquires over a phone, etc.

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<sup>1</sup> For its origin, see Cook (1994).

<sup>2</sup> For other viewpoints, see Tannen (1979), Brown and Yule (1983).

After finishing cognition, the floor is handed over to communication, which is the second level constituting the structure of examples. In this work, by communication is meant contextualizing an utterance. The key words in Zillman and Brosius' definition which pragmatically configure this level are "foster dispositions... similar". Fostering disposition, in fact, entails the process of inferencing in order to "direct our behavior toward *similar* occurrences" (italics mine). 'Similar', in turn, entails analogy. Worded another way, the communicative level is composed of two elements: inference and analogy, each of which is briefly discussed below.

As well-known, inferencing has a long history of research especially in logic, which does not serve this work. Nevertheless, there has been certain pragmatic treatment of the topic by: Toulmin et al. (1984) and Walton (1992 and 2008). They agree on embedding context (involving claims and their holders as well as the place of those claims, as it were) within the meaning of inferences, and this is what will be adopted in this study.

What is more important than the definition is the type of inferences employed in giving an example. Generally speaking, there are three principal types of inference, which will be tackled here on the basis of what Itkonen (2005, pp. 25-35) does<sup>(3)</sup>:

1. Deductive: non-ampliative inference (i.e. the conclusion is already embraced within the premises). Walton's (2008) example can be helpful:
  - (1) All birds (strictly speaking) fly.  
Tweety is a bird.  
Therefore, Tweety flies.
2. Inductive: ampliative inference (i.e. the conclusion need not be contained in the premises). Walton's (ibid.) example is cited:
  - (2) If I graduate, I have paid my tuition.  
I have paid my tuition.  
Therefore, I will graduate.
3. Abductive: ambivalent inference (every premise and conclusion is liable to change should any new premise is given, so the truthfulness and/or falsehood of premises and conclusions cannot be guaranteed). An example on this type can be seen in doing a jigsaw puzzle. At first we put a certain piece in a certain place thinking it to be correct. Then, a new piece shows to (likely) be the correct (this time), so we soon replace the first with the second which might not be the one, and so on. This continues till we finish all pieces en bloc ending with one, and only one, perfect picture.

As regards analogy, this, too, is a rich topic which has been dealt with variously from different perspectives (Cf. Walton (2002, 2006), Weinreb (2016), for instance). However, this study confines itself to define and classify this notion in what serves its aims.

According to Itkonen (2005, p.1), analogy involves structural similarity that holds among the relations between two (or more) systems. In other words, it is a meta-relation: a relation holding between relations. He (ibid.) illustratively cites this example of an analogy between a bird and fish:

Wing: lungs: feathers= fins: gills: scales.

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<sup>3</sup> For more types, see Mirza and Al-Hindawi (2016).

What is similar here, he comments, is the functional relation between these parts, and not the parts themselves. So, analogy ends up as a structural-functional notion. Moreover, he (ibid., p.13) adds an important feature: context-relativity, whether where analogy is used or from which angle it is approached. For example, he (ibid.) continues, the analogy, above, between a bird and fish is acceptable when considered anatomically (one context), but when taking locomotion (another context) into account, then birds become analogous, actually, to flies rather than to fish. And it is this remark on context on which the present work stands as far as analogy is concerned.

There remains one important thing to close the discussion on analogy down – types. As a matter of fact, while searching for ‘types of analogy’, several have appeared, none of which appeals to this work. As a result, the analogy is generally classified, here, into two types:

1. Symmetrical: Seamless analogy between two (or more) comparable examples on a functional ground of similarity, as done by Itkonen in his ‘bird vs. fish’ example above.

2. Faulty: This can be better explained by quoting Emeren et al. (2002): “comparing two (or more) things which are either incomparable or there might exist some special circumstances that invalidate the comparison”. They, however, do not give an example, so Walton (1995, pp.60-1) is invoked:

(3) Suppose someone defended open textbook examinations with the following argument: “No one objects to the practice of a physician looking up a difficult case in medical books. Why, then, shouldn’t students taking a difficult examination be permitted to use their textbook?”

They faulty analogy, Walton (ibid.) explains, is shown by the difference between the purpose and context of the action in the two cases.

### **2.3 Types**

Classifying examples moves around one pillar: the experience conveyed. That is, when an example is given, in fact some pieces of information (or experience) are invoked in a manner analogous to the current situation in one way or another. As such, Zillman and Brosius (2000, p. 28) divide examples, on the basis of the experience communicated, into two types:

1. Interpersonal: The examples given are based on our friends or acquaintances experience, i.e. what happened with them or they have heard about it.

2. Others’ observations: Here the examples given involves the “conveyance of others’ direct observation or experience”.


The present paper would add a third type: intrapersonal. By this is meant citing examples from the speaker’s, per se, experience without reference to the two previously mentioned types.

It is necessary to mention that this work does not find it exhaustive to classify examples to these three types only as they pertain mainly to meaning regardless of form, which is a flaw. Consequently, it is more accurate to taxonomize examples on the basis of their structure as well. Here the study proposes two types:

1. Explicit: Indicated by such words as ‘for example’, ‘for instance’, ‘as an example’, etc., or any phrase containing the words ‘example’ and ‘instance’.

2. Implicit: All other cases.

The question now: how can these five types of examples be related? This can be done by considering the ‘type’ of examples working at two levels: global and local. The former relates to meaning, the latter to form. Hence, the types can be re-classified as:



“Figure 1” Types of Examples

## 2.4. Functions of Examples

Surveying the literature on examples does not demonstrate separate functions for them, as found with other topics. Yet, this should not connote poverty of the source. It is possible to assign some functions, but how? It has been shown above that examples work at a communicative level, which means they work within the framework of a larger context. Since we have a system (i.e. an example) working within a larger system (i.e. context), then the functional explanation imposes itself. By functional explanation is meant, as Leech (1983, p. 48) defines it, “explaining why a given phenomenon occurs, by showing what its contribution is to a larger system of which it is itself a sub-system”. Needless to mention that language is the basic means in giving examples; by association, hence, the functions of language can be assigned, to a great extent, to examples. But what functions? As well-known, there are many taxonomies of the functions of language<sup>(4)</sup>, the first of which that paved the way for all the others is Jakobson’s (1960). However, the classification which serves this study, and thus is adopted, is Popper’s 1972, as cited in Leech (1983, pp. 49-50).

According to Popper, there are four functions of language (parenthesized terminology is mine):

1. Expressive: Using language to express internal states of the individual per se (that is, intrapersonal function).
2. Signaling: Using language to communicate information about internal states to other individuals (that is, interpersonal function).
3. Descriptive: Using language to describe things in the external world.
4. Argumentative: Using language to present and evaluate arguments and explanations.

Popper arranges these functions, Leech (ibid.) proceeds, hierarchically in an irreversible ascending way. That is, the functions move on a one-sided scale: a higher function must embrace all other lower ones, but not vice versa. Accordingly, the argumentative function embraces all the other three, whereas the expressive does not.

## 3. Model of Analysis


<sup>4</sup> See also: Leech’s (1974), Halliday’s (1975), and Finch’s (1997).

The model that will be utilized to analyze the data of the of the work is an eclectic one built out of all the notions discussed above. The model can be explained as follows:


An example is to be analyzed on three layers: structure, type, and function. Structure is built at two levels: cognitive and communicative. The former is instantiated by 'schema' with its various types. The latter, in turn, is re-written with inference (with its three types) and analogy (with its two types). Analyzing the structure automatically leads to identify the type of example at two levels: global (with its three types) and local (with its two types). After naming the type, the function, which a certain example serves, is specified in accordance with Popper's functions.

The following diagram schematically shows how examples are analyzed in this work:





“Figure 2” The Eclectic Model of Analysis



## 4. Data and Analysis

The data intended to be analyzed in this work are represented by some interviews, viz. four of Trump's interviews held on 2018 as cited in (web sources 1, 2, 3, and 4 for the four interviews respectively) from the most recent to the oldest. They are analyzed by the eclectic model just developed. Then, the percentage equation is used to statistically differentiate between the employment of the various components of the model.

It is to be noted that the four interviews are abbreviated as follows:

IN1: first interview.

IN2: second interview.

IN3: third interview.

IN4: fourth interview.

Before analyzing any example below, the full contextual factors are given: who says what to whom, where (if available) and when. Another important matter to spot is that the examples that will be analyzed are those given by Trump and not by his interviewer. This is owing to the abundance and variety of examples available in the answers than those in the questions, if any. Finally, the words which instantiate an example will be written in bold to distinguish them from the other parts of the excerpt.

However, there remains one important point to pin – criteria of specifying an utterance as an example. Since there are two types of examples at the local level (i.e. explicit and implicit), then there should be criteria on the basis of which an utterance is said to be an 'example' and nothing else. Consequently, the present work follows these criteria:

1. The presence of the words 'example', 'instance', 'like', 'such as', 'as in', with any construction to choose an explicit example.
2. Topical relevance: Subject matter overlap, as defined by Walton (1995, p. 171). He gives the following example:

- (4) Socrates is Greek.  
Plato is Greek.

The two sentences are related to each other by the topic or subject matter of nationality. So, if two utterances, in the data under investigation, are topically related, as shown above, without using the words 'example' or 'instance' in whatever construction, then they are considered as implicit examples.

### 4.1 Some Illustrative Examples for Pragmatic Analysis

Owing to the fact that the data are too many to be wholly analyzed in this paper; only some illustrative examples will be tackled, namely four examples, one from each interview. The rest, however, will be presented in a separate table, following the analysis, for the sake of exhaustiveness.

IN1: This example is taken from an interview between Trump and Piers Morgan on 28<sup>th</sup>, January, 2018, in Britain. Its topic is about controlling gun violence.

Morgan: Only 8 people were killed in American by Islamist terrorism in 2017. By comparison, domestic gun violence killed at least 30,000. There was another mass shooting in a school this week in Kentucky – the 12th this year alone. Two of the worst mass shootings in American history have happened on your watch, in Las Vegas and at the church in Texas. People will be saying you're very tough on security, you want to keep Americans safe, but if you don't do anything about gun violence at all, that seems an irrational position, for somebody who wants to keep America safe.

The President: I'm a very big Second Amendment person, as you know very well. **But take a look at Paris, where you have very very tough gun controls, take a look at that horrible slaughter that took place at the cafes where so many people were killed. And you had these thugs come in with guns. One by one for a long time, they just killed and hundreds of people wounded to this day still in the hospitals. That was one of the worst. And you've had many of them, where there are no guns except for the bad guys. So the bad guys have the guns, and if you would have had somebody with a gun right here when they walked in so that you could have had bullets going in the other direction, you wouldn't have had hundreds of people killed... By the way, you have many of those. You look at San Bernardino, California. These guys walk in – the people that they knew – they walk in and they start one by one shooting them. They had no chance.**

1. **Structure:** At the cognitive level, the type of schema employed is complex. That is, when Trump gives the example of Paris, he mentions a lot of other things which all collaborate to yield the final 'picture': tough gun controls, slaughter, so many people were killed, etc.

At the communicative level, however, inductive inference is found. It can be explained as follows:

- Paris has tough rules, yet it has crimes.
- America does not have tough rules.
- So, it does not have crimes. (which is incorrect)

As regards analogy, it is symmetrical. The comparison is made between two situations with domestic gun violence – one for American, the other for Paris.

2. **Type:** At the global level, this example pertains to 'others' experience as it discusses the situation in Paris.

At the local level, this example is implicit. It is topically related to the interviewer's question, again (gun-gun) matter.

3. **Function:** The function which this example serves is argumentative. What Trump attempts to state how difficult it is to impose law in such cases as there are many facets for this 'coin'.

IN2: The example, here, is taken from another interview between Trump and Joe Kernen of CNBC at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland in January 26, 2018. Its topic is about re-opening TPP.

Kernen: So you might re-enter — are you opening up the door to reopening TPP? Or ...

The President: I'm only saying this: I would do TPP if we were able to make a substantially better deal. The deal was terrible. The way it was structured was terrible. If we did a substantially better deal I would be open to TPP.

Kernen: That's interesting. Would you handicap ...

The President: Are you surprised to hear me say that?

Keren: I'm a little bit, yeah. I'm a little taken aback ...

The President: Don't be surprised, no. But we have to make a better deal ...

Keren: I want to know ...

The President: The deal was a bad deal, **like the Iran deal is a bad deal** ...

1. **Structure:** At the cognitive level in this very short example, the type of schema employed is complex. It is so because Trump attempts to explain how bad deals actually preclude the progression of certain issues as in TPP. Thus, the TPP will not be opened unless a better deal is made. The complex schema is depicted by the word 'bad' itself. So, the complex schema in this example is an amalgam between the bad deal with Iran and TPP.

At the communicative level, however, deductive inference is found. It can be explained as follows:

- TPP was a bad deal like the Iran deal.
- Bad deals are not re-opened.
- So, TPP will not re-opened as long as it is a bad deal.

As regards analogy, it is symmetrical. The comparison is made between two bad deals.

2. **Type:** At the global level, this example indicates 'interpersonal experience as it highlights a deal which is known to both Keren and Trump.

At the local level, this example is explicit. The word 'like' is employed to actualize the explicitness of the example.

3. **Function:** Again, the function which this example serves is argumentative. Trump attempts to show how bad deals are not tolerated.

IN3: Trump's Interview with Reporters on Testifying Under Oath to Special Counsel Robert S. Mueller III in January 24, 2018. Its topic is about talking to counsel Mueller and whether there is a fixed date for that.

Reporter: Are you going to talk to Mueller?

The President: I'm looking forward to it, actually.

Reporter: Do you have a date set? Do you have a date set, Mr. President?

The President: There's been no collusion whatsoever. There's no obstruction whatsoever. And I'm looking forward to it. I do worry when I look at all of the things that you people don't report about, with what's happening. **If you take a look at, you know, the five months' worth of missing texts — that's a lot of missing texts. And as I said yesterday, that's prime time.**

**So you do sort of look at that and say, "What's going on?" You do look at certain texts where they talk about insurance policies or insurance where they say the kinds of things they're saying, you gotta be concerned. But I would love to do that, and I'd like to do it as soon as possible.**

1. **Structure:** The schema employed in this example, at the cognitive level, is world schema. It describes the way how Trump gets worried about unreported things, and what things should reporters focus on and how.

At the communicative level, abductive inference is found. It can be justified better after unfolding the type of analogy below.

As regards analogy, it is faulty. The comparison is made between two unrelated matters: fixing a date for talking to Muller and worrying about ‘unreported things’ like the missing texts. The reason why inference is considered abductive above is that the premises in this example are very liable to change as they are not relevant to the main premise found in the reporter’s question. Thus, they can be easily changed in order to pertain to the main issue being argued.

2. **Type:** At the global level, this example indicates ‘interpersonal experience as it spots an issue known to both the reporter and Trump.

At the local level, this example is explicit. The word ‘take a look’ is employed to actualize the explicitness of the example.

3. **Function:** This example, actually, serves two functions: expressive and descriptive. The first is instantiated by Trump’s words ‘I do worry’. The second, in turn, is represented by his description of the way via which reporters should report matters.

IN4: Trump’s Interview with the Wall Street Journal in January 11, 2018. Its topic is about economic situation in the markets.

Wall Street Journal: Did you see the other economy news yesterday? The markets did dip a little bit after some news suggesting that you were going to maybe pull out of Nafta. I wonder where you're at on Nafta and if you're concerned about the impact pulling out and renegotiating could have on the market.

The President: I'm not sure that markets would dip; I think that markets would—I can tell you I'm not sure about world markets, but I can tell you I think the American market would go up if I terminated Nafta and renegotiated a new deal.

We are—when I campaigned I said we'll either renegotiate Nafta or I'll terminate it.

And nothing's changed, I **have fulfilled many of my campaign promises. One of the promises that you know is being very seriously negotiated right now is the wall and the wall will happen.** And if you look—point, after point, after point—now we've had some turns. You always have to have flexibility. **As an example, we've been much tougher on China, but not nearly as tough as I would be, but they are helping us a lot with North Korea.**

**And you see in North Korea what's happening with North Korea all of a sudden. China's been helping us a lot, so you can veer a little bit differently, but for the most part everything I've said I've done.**

This example is a little bit different from all the examples discussed above: it embraces three examples within. They are presented separately, yet interrelatedly. That is, they are issued

with different topics, but they serve the same topic which is completely unrelated to the main topic asked about by the interviewer. Nevertheless, they will be treated as one.

1. **Structure:** The schema employed in this example is world schema. Trump just describes how he fulfills his promises (one of which is the wall). Then, he mentions something about flexibility, and points out China as an example. Finally, he relates North Korea to China, showing the difference between them. All he does is describing things.

At the communicative level, abductive inference is found. It can be justified by the faulty analogy employed, which is better explained below.

As regards analogy, it is faulty. The comparison is made between two unrelated matters: economic situation in the market and fulfilling his (i.e. Trump’s) promises. As mentioned above, when analogy is faulty, then inference becomes abductive because it is always prone to change whenever it is questioned; it does not relate to the main premise.

2. **Type:** At the global level, this example indicates ‘interpersonal experience’ as it spots an issue known to both the interviewer and Trump.

At the local level, this example is explicit. The words ‘one of’ and ‘as an example’ are employed to actualize the explicitness of the example.

3. **Function:** This example serves two functions: signaling and descriptive. The first is instantiated by Trump’s words ‘we’ve been tough’, ‘helping us’. The second, in turn, is represented by his description of the promises he fulfilled and how they have been flexible.

“Table 1” shows the analysis of the remaining situations in the four interviews mentioned above. Hence, the contextual factors are not re-written.

“Table 1” Analysis of the Remaining Situations

No.	Schema			Inference			Analogy		Type					Function			
	C	W	In.	D	I	A	S	F	Intra.	Inter.	O	Ex.	Im.	E	Si.	De.	Ar.
IN1	10	3	0	9	3	1	13	0	3	9	1	1	12	0	0	0	13
IN2	8	2	0	6	2	2	9	1	0	6	4	1	9	0	0	0	10
IN3	2	0	0	0	0	2	0	2	0	1	1	0	2	0	0	0	2
IN4	16	3	0	15	2	2	17	2	3	11	5	8	11	0	0	0	19

**Key:** C= complex, W= world, In.= interpersonal, D= deductive, I= inductive, A= abductive, S= symmetrical, F= faulty, Intra.= intrapersonal, Inter.= interpersonal, O= others’, Ex.= explicit, Im.= implicit, E= expressive, Si.= signaling, De.= descriptive, Ar.= argumentative.

## 4.2 Statistical Analysis and Results

After analyzing all the situations in the four interviews, viz. 48 situations (14, 11, 3, and 20 from the four interviews, respectively), the percentages of the employment of all the strategies are calculated in this section by employing the percentage equation. In accordance with the illustrative analysis and “Table 1” above, “Table 2” gives the results. Moreover, Figures ‘3-8’ graphically show the different percentages of the results as distributed over all the components of the model.

As “Table 2” demonstrates, the highest percentages, written in bold red, are recorded for the following strategies:

- **Complex schema** has the highest percentage in the four interviews: 78.6, 81.8, 100, and 80%, respectively. This finding verifies the first hypothesis.
- **Deductive inference** has the highest percentage in three interviews: 64.3, 63.6, and 75%, in the first, second and fourth interviews respectively.
- **Symmetrical analogy** has the highest percentages in three interviews: 100, 90.9, and 85%, in the first, second and fourth interviews respectively.
- **Interpersonal-experience examples**, part of the global type, have the highest percentages in all the interviews: 64.3, 63.6, 66.7, and 60%, respectively. This verifies fourth hypothesis..
- **Implicit examples**, part of the local type, have the highest percentages in all the interviews: 92.8, 81.8, 66.7, and 55%, respectively. This finding rejects the fifth hypothesis.
- **The argumentative function** grabs the highest percentages in all the interviews: 100, 100, 33.4, and 90%, respectively. This result verifies the sixth hypothesis.


However, the results above reject the second and third hypotheses respectively.

“Table 2” Results of Calculating Percentages of All the Strategies in the Four Interviews


No.	Schema		Inference			Analogy			Type			Function					
	C	W	In.	D	I	A	S	F	Intra	Inter	O	Ex.	Im.	E	Si.	De.	Ar.
IN1	78.6%	21.4%	0%	64.3%	28.6%	7.1%	100%	0%	21.4%	64.3%	14.3%	7.2%	92.8%	0%	0%	0%	100%
IN2	81.8%	18.2%	0%	63.6%	18.2%	18.2%	90.9%	9.1%	0%	63.6%	36.4%	18.2%	81.8%	0%	0%	0%	100%
IN3	100%	0%	0%	0%	0%	100%	0%	100%	0%	66.7%	33.3%	33.3%	66.7%	33.3%	33.3%	0%	33.4%
IN4	80%	20%	0%	75%	10%	15%	85%	15%	15%	60%	25%	45%	55%	0%	5%	5%	90%

**Key:** C= complex, W= world, In.= interpersonal, D= deductive, I= inductive, A= abductive, S= symmetrical, F= faulty, Intra.= intrapersonal, Inter.= interpersonal, O= others', Ex.= explicit, Im.= implicit, E= expressive, Si.= signaling, De.= descriptive, Ar.= argumentative.







“Figure 3” Percentage of Types of Schema in the Four Interviews




“Figure 4” Percentage of Types of Inference in the Four Interviews




“Figure 5” Percentage of Types of Analogy in the Four Interviews



“Figure 6” Percentage of Global Types of Examples in the Four Interviews



“Figure 7” Percentage of Local Types of Examples in the Four Interviews



“Figure 8” Percentage of Functions of Examples in the Four Interviews

## 5. Conclusions

In line with the results above, the study concludes the following:

1. The workability of the model has been proved as almost all the strategies constituting the model have been found in the data. One exception being the 'interpersonal schema' whose employment is 0%, which can be attributed to the nature of data themselves.
2. There is a positive correlation between:
  - a) abductive inference and faulty analogy (both show 100% employment). This is due to the fact that a faulty analogy once objected to, the truthfulness of all the premises issued will be at stake. Thus, they are always liable to change, and this breathes relevance to the gist of abduction.
  - b) Implicit examples (with their percentages: 92.8, 81.8, 66.7, 55%, respectively) and their function, that is, the argumentative function (whose percentages are: 100, 100, 33.4, 90, respectively). Argumentation hinges upon rhetoric which, in turn, dwells on implicitness as it gives much latitude for the speaker to develop certain standpoints without necessarily holding the burden of proving them as they can readily, and easily, be changed and/or denied.
3. Complex schema is the most common type employed in the examples due to the nature of the speech event per se. That is, in interviews, the topic being argued imposes the type of schema pertained. This is supported by the null employment of interpersonal schema whose percentage is (0%). This means that the nature of the speech event (interviews in our case) strongly affects the kind of schema employed.
4. The highest percentage which deductive inference demonstrates in fact feeds the cogency of the standpoint being developed. Because of this inference, the truthfulness of the premise guarantees that of the conclusion. Hence, Trump actually develops cogent arguments which are, to a greater extent, not objected to.
5. In accordance with the conclusion above, it can be claimed that examples, in general, support the cogency of argumentation. Once given in a certain structure, they both strengthen and boost one's standpoints towards the alleged goals.
6. Speaking of cogency, it is basically appealed to at the global level of the type of example. It dwells on things publicly known to both interlocutors (addresser and addressee) in the interview, thus they cannot be always questioned. As for the local level of the type of example, it imitates rhetoric: the more indirect one is, the more space there will be to propose.
7. There is a fine line between analogy and example which is mainly instantiated by using 'like' and 'as in'. Whenever each is used, only the context determines whether an utterance embeds an example or analogy. Thus, the relationship between them is not mutually reciprocal. That is, an example by

nature entails analogy; the reverse does not hold. Consequently, it can be stated that example is an all-embracing concept.

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